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PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION IN 
ROMANIA: A COMPARISON WITH OECD 
COUNTRIES
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Less restrictive product market policies are crucial in promoting convergence to higher 
levels of GDP per capita. This paper benchmarks product market policies in Romania 
to those of OECD countries by estimating OECD indicators of Product Market 
Regulation (PMR). The PMR indicators allow a comprehensive mapping of policies 
affecting competition in product markets. Comparison with OECD countries reveals 
that Romania’s product market policies are less restrictive of competition than most 
direct comparators from the region and not far from the OECD average. Nonetheless, 
this achievement should be interpreted in light of the fact that PMR approach 
measures officially adopted policies. It does not capture implementation and 
enforcement, the area where future reform efforts should be directed if less restrictive 
policies are to have an effective impact on long-term growth prospects.  Part II: 
Outward-oriented Policies with some suggestions for the next steps. 
 
Keywords:  regulation, product markets, administrative reforms, inward looking 
policies, outward looking policies 
JEL classification: L51 
Outward Oriented Policies 
Observance and implementation of the rules for membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and, even more strongly, the European Union (EU) has led to a 
significant reduction of barriers to trade and investment in Romania since the start of 
transition.  Romania’s foreign trade policy has been driven most of all by the 
commitments of the EU Eastern Enlargement project, promoting bilateral trade 
liberalization initially with the EU and EFTA and, subsequently, with other preferential 
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partners of the EU.  The Pan-European Agreement on the Cumulation of the Rules of 
Origin, combined with the gradual removal of tariffs on all industrial products by 
January 2002
1, and the harmonization of technical standards has led to Romania’s 
participation in a de facto free trade area for industrial products (World Bank, 2004).  
The removal of tariffs on agricultural and agro-processed goods, in January 2007, as 
Romania joined the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has completed the 
liberalization of trade with the EU. 
As a testimony to Romania’s success in this respect, in conjunction with the 
advancements in structural reforms, net foreign direct investment  inflows increased 
from 2.9% of GDP in 2001 to over 9% in 2006 (Figure 1).  FDI went to a variety of 
sectors, notably manufacturing, financial sector, real estate, trade, and transport.   
Equally important, in recent years, FDI has covered a large part of the expanding 
external current account deficit.  In 2006, for example, FDI covered around 90% of the 
10.3% of GDP current account deficit.  This is expected to decline in 2007, owing to a 
slowdown in privatization.  Looking forward, strong FDI inflows, and especially green 
field investment, as privatization comes to an end, will be instrumental in ensuring 
continued macroeconomic stability and productivity growth.  Therefore, policies aimed 
at improving the business environment would need to be implemented with priority.  
Figure 1 
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Source: WIIW, Eurostat, NBR. 
*Data for Romania refer to 2003-06.     
*Data for Bulgaria refer to 2003-05. 
 
Outward oriented policies include explicit barriers to trade and investment (such as 
foreign ownership barriers, discriminatory procedures against foreign firms, and tariffs) 
and regulatory barriers (such as a failure to engage in international harmonization 
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in 1993.  Product Market Regulation in Romania 
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treaties etc.)  These are reviewed in turn below, but can be summarized as follows: 
Romania has achieved substantial progress on all count except tariffs, which as of the 
spring of 2006 remained substantially above the EU.  The policy implication of this is 
nil however, since Romania’s tariff policies are now governed by the EU’s foreign 
trade regime as of January 2007.    
Explicit Barriers to Trade and Investment 
The first generation of reforms, anchored in the 1993 European Association 
Agreement, rapidly succeeded in eliminating all quantitative restrictions and the state 
monopoly over foreign trade (World Bank 2004).  The EU Eastern enlargement project 
rapidly led to Romania’s participation in the European free trade area.  The 
association with the EU also encouraged bilateral trade liberalization with other 
countries enjoying preferential trade relations with the EU, such as the countries of 
South Eastern Europe.  Romania is still part of CEFTA, whose expansion in Eastern 
Europe it actively encourages.  
However, Romania did not make similar progress in multilateral trade liberalization.  
Romania’s tariff levels, measured here as MFN tariffs on industrial goods, remained 
higher in 2006 than both in comparator middle income countries and in all the pre-
accession OECD CEE (Figure 2).  In particular, Romania entered the EU with 
substantially higher tariff levels than Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic in 2004.  However, as of January 1, 2007, tariff levels have been 
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Source:  Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005)  and, for Bulgaria and Romania,  World 
Bank estimates based on information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian   
authorities and Doing Business in 2005.  
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score 
was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full 
data set see Appendix I. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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In contrast, Romania compares well with both high income EU countries and with pre-
accession CEE countries and other MICs with respect to foreign ownership barriers 
(Figure 3). Substantial progress has been achieved in this regard compared to 2002. 
Figure 3 























Source:  Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005)  and, for Bulgaria and Romania,  World 
Bank estimates based on information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian   
authorities and Doing Business in 2005.  
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score 
was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full 
data set see Appendix I. 
 
Foreign ownership barriers take the form of statutory or other legal limits to the 
proportion of shares that can be acquired by foreign investor or of special voting rights 
that can be exercised in case of acquisition of equity by foreign investors. Such 
restriction may apply in general or in specific sectors that are considered ‘strategic’ 
such as air transport, telecommunications, and electricity generation.  The good (low) 
score of this indicator for Romania is due to the absence of both of general ownership 
barriers and barriers in specific sectors.  It should be noted, however, that in Romania 
such statutory or legal restrictions to the proportion of shares acquired by investors, 
apply not only to foreign but also to domestic investors.  For instance, as in other EU 
countries, a 49% foreign ownership ceiling remains in place in the airlines sector. 
This means that Romania does not discriminate between domestic and foreign firms, 
a factor that also explains also the better rating at procedural level.  Foreign firms in 
Romania have equal rights with domestic firms to appeal and redress through  Product Market Regulation in Romania 
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competition agencies, regulatory bodies, trade policy bodies, or private rights of action 
(Figure 4).   
Figure 4 





















Source:  Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005)  and, for Bulgaria and Romania,  World 
Bank estimates based on information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian   
authorities and Doing Business in 2005.  
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score 
was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full 
data set see Appendix I. 
Other Barriers to Trade and Investment 
Romania has also completely eliminated other regulatory barriers to trade and 
investment, which were already relatively low in 2002 (Figure 5).  These barriers 
include the existence of specific provisions which require regulators to recognize 
regulatory measures performed in other countries; to use internationally harmonized 
standards and certification procedures; or avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness.   
Engaging in mutual recognition agreements with other countries also helps reducing 
other barriers to trade and investment.  In this respect, Romania has in fact achieved 
best practice. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Figure 5 
Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Investment 



















Source:  Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005)  and, for Bulgaria and Romania,  World 
Bank estimates based on information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian   
authorities and Doing Business in 2005.  
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score 
was calculated using a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full 
data set see Appendix I. 
Conclusions: The Need to Focus on 
Implementation, Compliance and Enforcement 
The main conclusions of the report can be summarized as follows:   
Romania performs quite well on the PMR indicators, showing a significant 
improvement since 2002: out of the 15 low-level indicators underlying the 
overall PMR, Romania has achieved best practice in seven.  These comprise most 
of the ones falling under barriers to entrepreneurship (licenses and permits systems, 
communication and simplification of rules, administrative burden for corporations, 
legal barriers to competition and antitrust exemptions), and two of the four that make 
up barriers to trade and investment (discriminatory procedures and regulatory 
barriers). In these indicators Romania performs better than the OECD average and on 
a par with the best OECD countries. A third one – tariffs - has now been brought down 
to the EU average.   
Romania could still achieve significant progress in the extent of control the 
state still exerts over the economy.  Indeed, as Figure 6 demonstrates, Romania is 
still far from the OECD average, let alone best practice,
1 with respect to the size of the 
public enterprise sector (although as noted above, this may well be driven by the 
                                                             
1 In the PMR system “best practice” would correspond to an indicator value close to zero, 
meaning that no regulatory restrictions are imposed.  Product Market Regulation in Romania 
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estimation techniques used in this).  More importantly, Romania is also far from best 
practice relative to the nature of the control of public enterprise by legislative bodies, 
notably through the government’s share in Petrom. On the scope of the public 
enterprise sector, the existence of price controls and reliance on command and 
control regulation performance is close to the OECD average.  Finally, in the areas of 
foreign ownership barriers and sector specific administrative burden, it is already 
better than the OECD and very close to best practice on all three counts.   
Figure 6 
Remaining Gaps as Compared to the OECD Average 
 
 
Concerning the use of command and control regulation, concrete steps could be for 
the Government to issue guidance and training on using alternative to traditional 
regulation – which as Annex Table A2.5 shows, is the principal remaining 
improvement still pending.  More substantively, this requires changing the regulatory 
and administrative culture so that new regulation is not the default option to modify 
economic behavior.  Box 1 discusses alternative regulatory approaches.  
Box 1 
 Alternative Regulatory approaches 
Performance-Based Regulations—specify required outcomes or objectives rather 
than the means by which they must be achieved.  Thus firms and individuals can 
choose processes that are more efficient and less costly, which promotes the use of 
new technology on a broader scale.  Such type of regulation is increasingly used in 
health, safety, consumer protection, and environmental regulation.  Drawbacks 
include measurement problems related to desired outcomes, higher administrative 
and monitoring costs, greater responsibilities for small companies to develop 
appropriate compliance strategies.  Most countries have resorted to the use of 
guidelines or “safe harbors” in conjunction with performance-based regulation.   
Guidelines provide information on appropriate compliance strategies, while safe 
harbors allow the benefits of certainty of compliance associated with prescriptive 
regulation to be attained, while also allowing more innovative firms to take advantage 
of the benefits of such regulation. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Process Based Regulations—require businesses to develop processes that 
systematically control and minimize production risks. These processes are used in 
businesses with multiple and complex sources of risk, where ex post testing of the 
product is either ineffective or expensive.  Process based regulation is predominantly 
used in health, food safety, and environmental regulation.   
Co-regulation—businesses take the lead in regulation through endorsement and 
adherence to codes of practice.  This type of regulation is highly cost effective for the 
government.  Drawbacks include the possibility for encouraging anti-competitive 
activities by business or professional organizations.   
Economic Instruments—taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, vouchers and the like.  
Economic instruments allow businesses to achieve regulatory goals in the least costly 
manner and provide market incentives which reward the use of innovation and 
technical change. 
Information and Education—most widely used approach to regulation in OECD 
member states; empower consumers to adopt actions or make informed choices to 
change their behavior.  Examples include campaigns aimed at reducing speeding 
when driving, anti-litter behaviors; reducing the use of drinking water; eco-labeling of 
products. 
Guidelines—issued by regulatory authorities, setting out processing or providing 
interpretations to aid understanding of government objectives by businesses and 
citizens.  Guidelines may accompany existing regulations, but also are increasingly 
used as stand-alone documents.  Guidelines, for example, are widely used in the area 
of consumer protection in Denmark.   
Voluntary Approaches—initiated by industries, sometimes formally sanctioned or 
endorsed by government.  They include voluntary initiatives, voluntary codes, 
voluntary agreements, and self-regulation.  An example of a voluntary arrangement is 
the chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program, used in 40 countries, which 




As to the extent of direct control over business enterprises in which the state holds 
interest, Romania has limited, but not fully eliminated, the use of golden share to 
affect strategic decisions of firms.  Eliminating legal constraints to the sale of the 
stakes held by the government in these firms (a practice followed by more than half 
OECD countries) is the one remaining possible step.   
So, while Romania can certainly continue to improve on rules and regulations 
governing product market regulations, the pending challenge has to do with improving 
practices. 
Without effective implementation and enforcement, the effects of policy 
measures to increase competition in product markets will not be visible.  For 
instance, notwithstanding the enormous progress evident from the dramatic 
improvement since the 2002 PMR, BEEPS data indicate that competitive pressures 
on incumbents remain low compared to other countries in the region and have not 
substantially changed between 2002 and 2005 (Figure 7).  Product Market Regulation in Romania 
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Figure 7 












Czech Rep. Romania Bulgaria Slovak Rep. Poland Hungary
2002 2005
 
Source: WB-EBRD BEEPS 2002 and 2005. 
Note: Percentage of firms responding ‘Many of our customers would buy from our 
competitors instead’ to the question ‘Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical 
question. If you were to raise your prices of your main product line or main line of 
services 10% above their current level in the domestic market (after allowing for any 
inflation) which of the following would best describe the result assuming that your 
competitors maintained their current prices?’. 
 
A series of prerequisites is necessary to improve the effectiveness of the application 
of regulation and, ultimately, to increase the long run competitiveness of the 
Romanian economy. These belong to the institutional domain and include:  
(i)  Political commitment at the highest level.  Ensuring political support from the 
highest level of government is crucial to generate consensus for reform both 
within and outside public administration.  In particular, leadership and support 
from the Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidential Administration will help in 
clarifying the allocation of functions and responsibilities among ministries and 
relevant government agencies with respect to the ownership of the reforms. 
(ii)  Changes in the institutional architecture of the government to improve 
oversight and coordination of reforms pertaining to product market 
liberalization.  Political support should be reflected in the reorganization of the 
institutional architecture of government with the objective of improving the 
coordination and cooperation among implementing agencies and the oversight of 
the overall regulatory process.  In particular, the Business Environment 
Department, responsible for oversight and coordination of the implementation of 
the regulatory reform agenda, should be placed under the Prime Minister’s office, 
where it used to be prior to the latest governmental reorganization. 
(iii)  Enhanced capacity of the public administration.  Another major obstacle to 
the successful implementation of regulatory reform was identified in the ability of Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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the administration to serve the reform agenda.  Important shortcomings in this 
area concern (i) orientation towards compliance with formal procedures – as 
opposed to a drive for results; and (ii) inadequate level of qualification, especially 
in the lower echelons of the civil service, associated with poor remuneration and 
inefficient procedures of selection and promotion. 
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Detailed Results of PMR Survey for Romania 
Table A2. 1 




Table A2. 2 




proceeds as (pct of 
GDP)
1 
Size of public sector 
(0 to 6 index)
2 
1994   6.0 
1995 1.2  5.9 
1996 1.8  5.6 
1997 2.3  5.4 
1998 2.1  5.1 
1999 1.2  5.0 
2000 0.2  4.9 
2001 0.1  4.9 
2002 0.2  4.9 
2003 0.2  4.9 
2004 0.3  4.8 
2005 0.19  4.8 
2006 0.23  4.8 
 
1/ Source 
2/ The 1995 figure is from Gwartney and Lawson (1997), but rescaled from a 0 to 10 scale (with 0 the worst or largest 
size of the public sector), to follow the 0 to 6 scale of the PMR (where 6 is now the worst ranking).  Data for subsequent 
years were calculated relying on a perpetual inventory method type of approach: It= It-1 +0.2*(Pt-1), where the first It-1 is the 
original index (equal to zero for 1996) and Pt-1  is the privatization proceeds flow for the year.  We are grateful to Paul 
Conway for his help in calculating these data in a manner consistent with the overall PMR.    
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Table A2. 3 













Table A2. 5 




Table A2. 6 
Licenses and permits system  
Yes No Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
1/3 0 6 no yes n.a. n.a. no yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
20 2 . 222 0
Coding of answers
Country scores (0-6)
The 'silence is consent' rule (i.e. that licenses are
issued automatically if the competent licensing office
has not acted by the end of the statutory response
period) is used at all
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)
for getting information on notifications and licenses
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)










Table A2. 7 
Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
1/2
2/12 6 - yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/12 6 - yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes























1/3 yes no n.a. n.a. yes no
1/3 no yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 yes yes n.a. n.a. no no









National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps 
a complete count of the number of permits and licenses 
required 
There are systematic procedures for making regulations 
known and accessible to affected parties
There is a general policy requiring "plain language" 
drafting of regulation
There are inquiry points where affected or interested 
foreign parties can get information on the operation and 
enforcement of regulations
Affected parties have the right to appeal against 
adverse enforcement decisions in individual cases
Government policy imposes specific requirements in 
relation to transparency/freedom of information 
government wide
Country weight (0-1) 
Administrative burdens for corporation
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
Sector specific administrative burdens 
2/12
Communication
There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative 
burdens imposed by government on enterprises and/or 
citizens
There is a program underway to review and reduce the 
number of licenses and permits required by the national 
government
Simplification










1/2*(Wi-Min W)/(Max W98- Min W)











Table A2. 8 
Administrative burden on corporations 
01234 5 6
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Number of mandatory procedures required to register 
a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=12 <=16 <=20 >20
11 5 14.9 14.5 28 15
Number of public and private bodies to contact to 
register a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5.0 5.1 6 8
Number of working days required to complete all 
mandatory procedures for registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration)
1/4 <=16.4 <=32.8 <=49.2 <=65.6 <=82 <=98.4 >98.4
32 11 23.8 22.3 90 15
Total cost (euros) of registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=500 <=1000 <=1500 <=2500 <=5000 <=7500 >7500
180.33 107.54 1108.14 899.07 n.a 721.97







NOTE: Values for Bulgaria and Romania were obtained based on Doing Business 2005 data. Since Doing Business information on 
number of procedures, number of days and cost connected with starting a company are not directly comparable to the same information 
in the OECD International Regulation Database, a normalization process was necessary to homogenize the scores obtained. The 
normalization process proceeded as follows.  
1) A standard score (also called z-score or normal score) was obtained as Z = (raw score - mean
OECD-DB)/standard deviation
OECD-DB 
based on the Doing Business sample, where the values for OECD countries refer to Doing Business 2003. The z-score reveals how 
many units of the OECD standard deviation Bulgaria and Romania are above or below the OECD mean. 
2) A transformed score, comparable to OECD scores obtained from the OECD International Regulation Database, is calculated for 






Table A2. 9 





















































Yes No - no no na na yes No
4321 0 -
1/3 yes no na na yes yes
1/3 no yes na na no no













































size of outlet 









size of outlet 



















na na always required
depends on 
size of outlet
1.88 0.75 1.67 1.56 4.11 1.91
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling food products 
Country scores (0-6)
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling clothing products 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 








Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for selling clothing products 
10
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to obtain a license (other than a 
driving license) or permit from the government or a 
regulatory agency
There are criteria other than technical and financial 
fitness and compliance with public safety 
requirements considered in decisions on entry of 
new operators
These entry regulations apply also if a firm wants to 
transport only for its own account
Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for seeling food products 









startups       w=wi 
/ Max w98
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 
commercial acitivity (not related to outlet siting)  for 
selling clothing products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling food products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling clothing products
Road freight
Retail distribution
Sector specific administrative burdens
10
Coding of answers
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to notify any level of government or a 
regulatory agency and wait for approval before they 
can start operation
Registration in transport register is required in order 
to establish a new business in the road freight sector
In order to operate a national road freight business, 

























Table A2. 10 
Legal barriers to entry 
ISIC      
(rev. 3.1)  
code
Sector Yes No Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 - no n.a. n.a. no no
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
28, 29 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
4010
Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity 
supply
1 6 0 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4020 Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas supply 1 6 0 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 yes no n.a. n.a. no -
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
601, 6303
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, 
Operation of railroad infrastrucutre
1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 - no n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport 1 6 0 no - n.a. n.a. - -
6023 Freight transport by road 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
61 Water transport 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
62 Air transport  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes yes n.a. n.a. no no
642
 Telecommunication: fixed-line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, 
internet services
1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
6519, 659, 
671
Financial institutions 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
74 Other business activity 160 n o yes n.a. n.a. no no
851  Human health activities  1 6 0 - - n.a. n.a. - -
9211, 
9212
Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
19% 33% 5% 23% 10% 10%
1.1 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6
proportion of sectors with legal 
Country scores (0-6)
 if number of answers>=20 then 
 iai answeri)/iai 
National, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number of 




Electricity: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: electricity 
generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity supply 
Gas: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: gas production/import 
or gas transmission or gas supply 
Railways: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the three following sectors: Passenger 
transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, Operation of railroad infrastructure 
Telecommunication: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: fixed-
line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, internet services.  
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Table A2. 11 
Antitrust exemptions for public enterprises or state-mandated actions 
 
Yes No
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
Is there rule or principle providing for exclusion or exemption 
from liability under the general competition law for conduct that 
is required or authorized by other government authority (in 
addition to exclusions that might apply to complete sectors)?
1/4 6 0
no no n.a. n.a. no no
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 


















Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 
exclusion or exemption from competition law such as vertical 

















Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 

















Country scores (0-6) 00 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
Coding of answers
Weight                =wi  
= (Scope + Size 
of public sector 
enterprises)/2) 
wi∗Σkck answerk / wi
max   





Table A2. 12 
Foreign ownership barriers 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
2/3*wi (% of 
business sectors 
in which the state 
controls at least a 
firm)







n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes
6 none none n.a. n.a. none none
<50% <40% <35% <30% <25%




concecpt of the 
ownership and 
control could be 
applicable
3.0 0.8 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.3
Memo item
61% 48% n.a. n.a. 96% 27%
Memo item:  % of business sectors in which the state controls 
at least a firm
Country scores (0-6)
Sector-specific barriers





There are statutory or other legal 
limits to the number or proportion of 
shares that can be acquired by 
foreign investors in publicly-controlled 
firms
Special government rights can be 
exercised in the case of acquisition of 
equity by foreign investors
Σjbj Σkck answerjk



















Table A2. 13 
Discriminatory procedures 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
General discrimination 2/3
3/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
2/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. no yes
Competition discrimination 1/3 n.a. n.a.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes no
Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
0 0.75 0.75 1.5 2.625 2.625 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 4.125 4.125 5.25 5.25 5.25 6
0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.25 1.13 Σjbj Σkck answerjk
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition and 
hence prevent effective access of foreign firms (foreign owned or 
controlled) to such markets, foreign firms can have redress 
through regulatory authorities involved 
Country scores (0-6)
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 








When appeal procedures relating to regulatory decisions are 
available in domestic regulatory systems, they are open to 
affected or interested foreign parties as well
There are specific provisions which require that regulations, prior 
to entry into force, be published or otherwise communicated to the 
public in a manner accessible at the international level
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 
foreign firms can have redress through trade policy bodies
0
0
0-6 Scale for competition discrimination
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 
foreign firms can have redress through competition agencies
6
6
Country has any specific provisions which require or encourage 
explicit recognition of the national treatment principle when 
applying regulations, so as to guarantee non-discrimination 






Table A2. 14 
Tariffs trade barriers 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak  Republic
Average production-weighted tariff <=3% <=6% <=9% <=12% <=15% <=18% >18% 8.6 15.8 5.5 4.4 13.4 5.1





Table A2. 15 
Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Yes No
The country has engaged in Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) in at least a sector with any 
other country
2/5 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to consider recognizing the 
equivalence of regulatory measures or the result 
of conformity assessment performed in other 
countries, wherever possible and appropriate
4/15 0 6 yes yes na na no no
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to use internationally 
harmonized standards and certification 
procedures wherever possible and appropriate
2/9 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
There are any specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulatory administrative procedures to 
avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness
1/9 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
Country scores (0-6) 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.18 0.00 1.60
Coding of answers
Σkck answerjk
Question 
weights 
(c k)
 
 
 